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Abstract
The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated
market are analised, in the absence of uncertainty. It turns out that if consumers’ marginal
willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently low, the efficiency effect observationally works so
as to favour innovation by the entrant, i.e., competition. Otherwise, it operates to the advantage
of the incumbent who acquire the right to innovate, preempting thus the rival.
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1. Introduction
We avail of a relatively large literature on the optimal choice of product quality by
oligopolists under either Bertrand or Cournot competition and simultaneous play (Shaked and
Sutton, 1982, 1983; Bonanno, 1986, inter alia). The sequential introduction of new products
has been analysed by Donnenfeld and Weber (1992, 1995) without explicitly taking into account
R&D efforts, which are instead the focus of the contributions due to Beath et al. (1987), Motta
(1992) and Rosenkranz (1995a,b). Beath et al. (1987) extend the analysis of Vickers (1986) to
the case of product innovation under vertical differentiation when there is a repeated patent
auction for innovations. Leaving the issue of the strategic timing of innovation outside the main
analysis, they find how the conditions for the persistence of quality leadership look like. Along
related lines, Rosenkranz (1995b) shows that the low-quality firm has a higher incentive to
innovate if the adjustment cost is sufficiently high. She also shows that a change of leadership
can be observed whenever adjustment cost is high or the degree of differentiation at the outset
is high enough. Motta (1992) investigate the impact of cooperation in the R&D stage on the
overall level of research effort and market structure. In his model, R&D is simply a tool for
improving product quality provided firms have already entered the market. Firms enter costlessly
and simultaneously, so that the timing of innovation is exogenous. In Rosenkranz (1995a) both
the quality and the timing of innovations are endogenous, and the author investigates the
conditions under which firms are incentivated to form a research joint venture. In the context
of horizontal differentiation, R&D competition between two firms both racing for the optimal
monopolistic location, i.e., the midpoint of the linear city, has been analysed by Harter (1993).
Product proliferation as a preemptive strategy has been investigated in countless
contribution, dealing mainnly with spatial differentiation (Hay, 1976; Eaton and Lipsey, 1979;
Bonanno, 1987, inter alia).1 To the best of my knowledge, the issue of entry deterrence through
1. See chapter 8 in Tirole (1988), and Gilbert (1989) for exhaustive accounts of this
literature.
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the strategic choice of product quality has been tackled only by Donnenfeld and Weber (1995).
Though, they do not specifically deal with the related problem of the persistence of monopoly
which has been largely debated in the R&D literature (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982, 1984;
Reinganum, 1983, to mention only the seminal contributions). Provided that a monopolist can
at least replicate the oligopolists’ performance, these contributions generally lead to the
conclusion that monopoly persists since the incumbent has a greater incentive to innovate or
preempt than the rival has to enter.
I will focus on the issue of the persistence of monopoly by analysing an adapted version
of the so called efficiency effect (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Tirole, 1988) in a vertically
differentiated market where it is assumed that all consumers buy one unit of the differentiated
good independently of the number of firms or goods. I shall assume that at a certain date an
incumbent, which is already supplying a vertically differentiated product whose quality cannot
be changed, and a potential entrant participate to an auction for a new product characterized by
a different quality. The firm who can bid more for the innovation acquires the right to produce
a goodwhose quality is then optimally defined according to the existing one, inorder tomaximize
either monopolistic profit, if the monopolist is the winner, or the entrant’s profit in the opposite
case. Then, prices are set according to the market structure previously emerged.
I will show that, due to the assumption of full market coverage, which may appear plausible
for instance when public utilities are considered, the efficiency effect operates so as to favour
the persistence of monopoly only if consumers are sufficiently rich. In such a case, the incumbent
is indifferent between introducing the new quality from below or above the existing one.
Otherwise, the incumbent offering two varieties can at most mimic the duopolists’ performance,
so that the outcomes associated with innovation by either firm are observationally equivalent,
in that both lead to a noncooperative duopoly where the innovation is characterized by a higher
quality as compared to the already existing variety.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the description
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of the model as well as the optimal price and quality choices by a single product monopolist.
In Section 3 I describe the choice of a second quality by the incumbent. The entrant’s behaviour
is investigated in Section 4. The issue of the persistence of monopoly is then addressed in Section
5. Finally, Section 6 provides concluding comments.
2. Single product monopolist
Consider a single product monopolist operating in a market for a vertically differentiated
good where consumers are characterized by a marginal willingness to pay for quality
The population of consumer is uniformly distributed over the interval, with
density 1, so that the total number of consumers in this market is also 1. Individuals derive a
net surplus from consumption defined as follows:
where q is the quality level and p is the price at which such a quality is being supplied. It is
assumed that all of them buy one unit of the differentiated product, i.e., that (1) is satisfied at
least as an equality for all consumers.
Technology is described by a cost function which is convex inquality and linear in quantity,
while the introduction of a product involves a sunk cost, or equivalently a fixed entry feefor
each variety, given by k and independent of the quality level, so that total costs for each product
are:
where x is the output level and t is a positive parameter. The condition imposed on k is such that
θ ∈ [θ, θ],
θ = θ + 1.θ > 0,
U = θq − p ≥ 0, (1
C = tq 2x + k , k < 1
27t
, (2
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the incumbent finds it advantageous to innovate independently of any entry threat, and she does
not gain any profit from keeping the patent asleep. The presence of a sunk cost also implies that
quality cannot be changed as a reaction to the introduction of a new variety, either by the same
firm or by a rival. Provided the market is completely covered, the monopolist’s profit function
is the following:
It can be immediately verified that
this can be given the following intuitive explanation: since by assumption all consumers buy a
unit of the good, the monopolist sets the maximum price consistent with this assumption, and
since costs are convex in quality, supplies the minimum quality in the range of consumers’
preferred qualities, which can be defined considering the quality levels required by
the maximization of consumer surplus (1) when each variety is sold at marginal cost (see Cremer
and Thisse, 1994).
Notice that the maximum price is given by
Substituting (5) into (3), the monopolist’s profit function is defined in terms of qM only:
piM = pM − tqM
2
− k . (3
∂piM
∂pM
> 0,
∂piM
∂qM
< 0; (4
[θ/2t , θ/2t]
pM
max
= θqM. (5
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function (6) is concave and single peaked,with the maximum at
which denotes the quality preferred by the consumer characterized by the lowest marginal
willingness to pay for quality, Furthermore, notice that a social planner aiming at the
maximization of social welfare would supply the quality preferred by the average consumer
characterized by i.e., 2
3. Innovation by the incumbent
I shall focus here on the introduction of a new variety by the monopolist, given that the
quality already being supplied is fixed at Generally speaking, the monopolist will offer
a high and a low quality product, segmenting the market in such a way that the demand for the
the two products are:
and the profit function is
piM = (θ − tqM)qM − k ; (6
piM
*
= (θ − 1)2/(4t) − k qM* = θ/(2t),
θ.
ˆθ = (θ + θ)/2, qSP* = (2θ − 1)/(4t).
θ/(2t).
xH = θ −
(pH − pL)
qH − qL
, xL =
(pH − pL)
qH − qL
− (θ − 1), (7
piM = (pH − tqH2)xH + (pL − tqL2)xL − 2k . (8
2. Here drastically emerges once more the well known result according to which the private
monopolist’s behaviour takes into account the marginal consumer, while the social planner’s
one takes into account the average consumer (see Spence, 1975, and Tirole, 1988, ch. 2). It can
be shown that when the number of varieties being supplied tends to infinity (or quality becomes
a continuous variable) the monopolist ends up offering the socially optimal top quality, while
she keeps undersupplying all the other qualities. Indeed, the distance between the monopolist’s
lowest quality and the social planner’s one is maximized when the number of varieties tends to
infinity (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Itoh, 1983; and Besanko et al., 1987).
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The price of the low quality good is while that of the high quality good is
obtained from the first order condition for profit maximization:
Substituting prices into (8), the monopolist’s profit can be written as a function of qualities only:
I am now in a position to investigate which kind of quality the monopolist would assign
to a new product. Assume first that the monopolist introduces a new variety from above, i.e.,
The candidate new variety has to be selected between the critical points of the
first order condition:
which are and Since only qH1 satisfies the second order
condition for a maximum, is the candidate high quality, yielding a profit gross
of fixed costs equal to Prices are and
which areboth positive given the viability condition Demands are xH=1/3
and xL=2/3. Finally, the degree of differentiation, measured by the distance between the two
goods along the quality spectrum, is qH-qL=1/(3t).
pL = θqL = (θ − 1)qL,
∂piM
∂pH
= 0 ⇒ pH
*
=
θqH + tqH2 − 2qL + θqL − tqL2
2
. (9
piM =
θ2qH − 2θtqH2 + t2qH3 − 4qL + 4θqL − θ
2qL + t2qH2qL − 4tqL2 + 2θtqL2 − t2qHqL2 − t2qL3
4
(10
qL = (θ − 1)/(2t).
∂piM
∂qH
|
qL =
θ − 1
2t
=
(3θ − 1 − 6tqH) (θ + 1 − 2tqH)
16 = 0, (11
qH1 = (3θ − 1)/(6t) qH2 = (θ + 1)/(2t).
qH = (3θ − 1)/(6t)
piM = (27θ2 − 54θ + 31)/(108t). pH = (9θ2 − 12θ + 7)/(18t)
pL = (θ − 1)2/(2t), θ > 1.
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Consider now what happens if the monopolist starts producing a good whose quality is
lower than that already available, i.e., assume Proceeding as above, from the
first order condition
I obtain and as the two critical points. Since only qL2 satisfies
the second order condition, it represents the candidate innovation from below, yielding
as the profits gross of fixed costs accruing to the two-product
monopolist. It appears immediately that they coincide with those obtained in the previous case,
so that the choice between introducing the new variety from above or from below depends upon
the conditions on ensuring the positivity of prices. In this setting, prices are
which is always positive given that the above viability condition
must be met, and which is positive if The same condition must
be satisfied in order for qL2 to be positive. Demands are xH=2/3 and xL=1/3 and the degree of
differentiation is the same as above. Post-innovation momopoly profits are strictly greater than
pre-innovation gross profits for all admissible values of The same holds for net profits if
k<1/27t. Hence, if the monopolist is indifferent between the two available alternatives,
while if she innovates from above, obtaining the same profit in either case.
4. Innovation by the entrant
I focus now on the setting where the entrant introduces a new variety and then plays
simultaneously in prices against the incumbent. The profits, gross of fixed costs, associated with
the two products are
qH = (θ − 1)/(2t).
∂piM
∂qL
|
qH =
θ − 1
2t
=
(3θ − 5 − 6tqL) (θ − 3 − 2tqL)
16 = 0, (12
qL1 = (θ − 3)/(2t) qL2 = (3θ − 5)/(6t)
piM = (27θ2 − 54θ + 31)/(108t)
θ
pH = (9θ2 − 18θ + 11)/(18t),
pL = (3θ − 5) (θ − 1)/(6t), θ > 5/3.
θ.
θ ≥ 5/3
θ ∈]1, 5/3[
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where demands xH and xL are defined as in (7). The problem can be solved as usual by backward
induction. From the first order conditions
the following noncooperative equilibrium prices can be obtained:
Hence, the profit functions (13) at the quality stage look as follows:
Provided the incumbent produces a good of quality the entrant has to choose between
competing from above or from below. Assume she decides to enter with a higher quality product.
In such a case, adding indexes i and e to identify the incumbent and the entrant, respectively,
the incumbent supplies Substituting the latter in (17) and differentiating
w.r.t. qHe, the first order condition for the entrant obtains:
piH = (pH − tqH2)xH, piL = (pL − tqL2)xL, (13
∂piH
∂pH
= θ −
(pH − pL)
qH − qL
−
(pH − tqH2)
qH − qL
= 0, (14
∂piL
∂pL
=
(pH − pL)
qH − qL
−
(pL − tqL2)
qH − qL
− (θ − 1) = 0. (15
pH =
qH + θqH + 2tqH2 − qL − θqL + tqL2
3 ; pL =
2qH − θqH + tqH2 − 2qL + θqL + 2tqL2
3 . (16
piH =
(qH − qL) (tqH − tqL − θ − 1)2
9 , piL =
(qH − qL) (2 − θ + tqH + tqL)2
9 . (17
(θ − 1)/(2t),
qLi = (θ − 1)/(2t). piH
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which yields the critical points and The second order
condition is satisfied only by qLe1, yielding gross profits and
Demands are xHe=4/9 and xLi=5/9, while finally prices are and
with pHe>pLi>0 by virtue of the overall viability condition
according to which Notice that, as it could be expected from the outset, innovation by the
entrant implies an increase in the degree of differentiation as compared to what obtains if the
innovation is introduced by the incumbent.
The opposite perspective, where the entrants innovates from below, can be quickly dealt
with. Qualities are qHi and qLe, respectively. The unique maximum of is at
yielding and as the duopolistic profits. Since the latter are both
lower than those obtained in the previous case, it appears that not only the entrant would choose
to compete from above,3 but both firms would strictly agree on that.
5. The persistence of monopoly
I am now able to assess the relative size of the incentives to innovate for the incumbent
and the entrant, in order to understand whether in a vertically differentiated market like the one
described in the previous sections a monopoly regime can be expected to persist under sequential
product innovation. The outcome of the auction for the product innovation is summarized by
the following
∂piHe
∂qHe
|
qLi =
(θ − 1)
2t
=
(3θ + 1 − 6tqHe) (θ + 3 − 2tqHe)
36 = 0, (18
qHe1 = (3θ + 1)/(6t) qHe2 = (θ + 3)/(2t).
piHe = 32/(243t) piLi = 50/(243t).
pHe = (27θ2 + 18θ + 35)/(108t)
pLi = (27θ2 − 54θ + 67)/(108t),
θ > 1.
qLe = (3θ − 5)/(6t),piLe
piHi = 49/(243t) piLe = 4/(243t)
3. This result sharply contrasts with a large part of the existing literature, e.g., Shaked and
Sutton (1982, 1983), where firms fill the product range starting from the top quality. Thedifferent
behaviour of the two models is due to the fact that here production costs are convex in quality.
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PROPOSITION. If the marginal willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently high and the
incumbent maximizes the joint profits associated with the two varieties, she is able to bid more
for the innovation and thus remains a monopolist. Otherwise, irrespectively of the innovator’s
identity, innovation by either firm yields a noncooperative duopoly outcome, where
observationally the entrant bids more for the innovation and enters the market with a variety of
higher quality than the incumbent’s.
PROOF. Consider first the relative performances in terms of profits of a monopolist offering
two products versus two oligopolists offering a single variety each. The incumbent will bid more
for the innovation, and thus remain a monopolist, if the following inequality is met:
that is
which, after simple manipulations, yields
Condition (21) is satisfied for This implies that the incumbent bids more than
the entrant and remains thus a monopolist when consumers are sufficiently rich. In such a case,
piM(qH, qL) ≥ pii(qLi) + pie(qHe), (19
27θ2 − 54θ + 31
108t ≥
50
243t +
32
243t , (20
243θ2 − 486θ − 49
972t ≥ 0. (21
θ ≥ 1 + 2√219 /27.
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the incumbent is also indifferent between introducing the new variety from above or from below.
Otherwise, if the incumbent is at best able to replicate the profit
performance of non colluding duopolists,4 by resorting to the noncooperative maximization of
the profits separately accruing to the two varieties, and virtually giving up her identity as a
monopolist her price-and-quantity setting behaviour is concerned. Hence, either of the two firms
may innovate, yielding a duopolistic market where the quality of the new product is higher than
the quality of the one already available, and variety innovation leads to an outcome which is
observationally equivalent in either case.5 Q.E.D.
A few comments are now in order. First, the effect I have taken into account, although
adapted to a context of endogenous differentiation, closely reflects the efficiency effect, as
defined by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Tirole (1988) following Arrow (1962), analogous
to the incentive to pre-empt of Katz and Shapiro (1987) and the competitive threat effect of
Beath et al. (1989). Contrarily to the results emerging from these contributions, where under
competition with homogeneous products the efficiency effect univocally favours the persistence
of monopoly, here the assumption of full market coverage makes it possible for the efficiency
effect to work in the opposite direction, since the monopolist would prefer not to serve the entire
market, provided that revenues increase linearly in quality while costs increase with the square
of quality (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978;Besanko etal., 1987; and the Appendix), while duopolists
may prefer either market regime, depending on the level of the marginal willingness to pay (see
the Appendix). Consequently, there exist an interval for as defined above, where the efficiency
θ ∈]1, 1 + 2√219 /27[,
θ
4. Notice that even in such an extreme situation the incumbent still have an incentive to
innovate, not only as a preemptive strategy but also because if the overall
profits accruing to non colluding duopolists are strictly higher than the monopolistic profit when
a single variety is supplied, provided k<1/27t.
5. It is worth stressing that this mirrors what happens with homogeneous goods when firms
bids for a drastic process innovation. In such a case, though, monopoly persists independently
of the identity of the innovator.
θ ∈]1, 1 + 2√219 /27]
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effect is such to operate so as to bring about a change in market structure from the previous
monopoly into a differentiated duopoly where the high quality good is supplied by the firm who
either has entered the market later or has acquired the right to innovate by winning the auction.
Incidentally, notice that this argument also implies that that when consumers are sufficiently
poor firms cannot gain from collusion, as there exists an interval for the marginal willingness
to pay where cartel profits are strictly lower than the sum of the noncooperative ones.
Second, it might be easily checked that in any other setting the efficiency effect would
work univocally to the advantage of the incumbent, leading to the persistence of monopoly for
allparameters values. Thiswould be particularly evident if firms wereable to adjust bothqualities
at the time of adoption of the innovation, i.e., in the absence of sunk costs. Furthermore, it would
intuitively apply if firms were allowed to choose whether to serve the entire market or restrict
output according to the relative profit performance attainable in the two cases. The persistence
of monopoly would obtain as well if the incumbent firm could anticipate the auction for the
innovation at some time in the future and adjusted the quality of the existing product accordingly
in advance, thus being able to bid more than the entrant.
Finally, in the light of the above analysis, the motivation at the basis of the full market
coverage assumption is twofold. On the one hand, a regulator may oblige the monopolist to
serve all consumers so as to increase social welfare. On the other, the regulator may introduce
such a rule anticipating that this may favour innovation so as to create market competition
irrespectively of the innovator’s identity.
6. Conclusions
In a model of vertical product differentiation with convex variable production costs of
quality, I have addressed the question whether in a market for endogenously differentiated goods
the incumbent has a higher incentive to innovate as compared to the potential entrant, under full
market coverage. I have also assumed that quality is chosen once and for all, i.e., it represents
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a long run commitment, so that the quality level of the existing variety cannot be adjusted as a
reaction to the introduction of an innovation.
In order to answer the above question, an adapted version of the well known efficiency
effect has been evaluated. Due to the fact that the market is completely covered, the direction
of the efficiency effect depends on the distribution of income, in that it leads to the conclusion
that the incumbent is more incentivated to innovate than the entrant only if the marginal
willingness to pay characterizing consumers is sufficiently high to justify the introduction of a
new variety. Otherwise, it works in such a way that market competition is observed once the
innovation has been introduced, independently of which of the two firm has won the auction.
According to the above results, it is possible to conclude that if the marginal willingness
to pay for quality is sufficiently low, the "observational" outcome is that the entrant has a higher
incentive than the incumbent and bids more for the innovation, introducing a variety of higher
quality than the one already being supplied by the incumbent. Thus, full market coverage appears
as an indirect tool that a regulator may adopt so as to positively affect competition and social
welfare, provided that the incumbent firm has tied her own hands by producing a certain quality
without anticipating the auction for an innovation.
Finally, it appears desirable for future research to investigate the alternative settings where
(i) technology is characterized by a different degree of convexity; and/or (ii) the distribution of
consumers is non-uniform, e.g., the number of consumers characterized by a low marginal
willingness to pay for quality is larger than the number of consumers whose marginal willingness
to pay is high; and/or (iii) the incumbent anticipates the possibility of an innovation, but there
is uncertainty about the auction date.
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Appendix
First, I am going to show that a single-product monopolist weakly prefers partial to full
market coverage. This result extends intuitively to the case of a multiproduct monopolist. I start
by considering a monopolist who is only partially serving the market, selling a single variety.
The demand for her product is:
so that the monopolist’s profit function is:
Observe that, potentially, the monopolist could choose not to exclude any individual from
consumption by setting the price-quality ratio below so as to serve the entire market. If this
doesnot obtainsat equilibrium, it implicitly means that themonopolist prefersquantity restriction
to quality distortion. Optimal quality and price can be obtained by solving the first order
conditions (it can be easily shown that second order conditions are also satisfied):
yielding and The equilibrium quantity is and profit amounts
to
x = θ − p
q
, (a1
pim = (p − tq2)x . (a2
θ,
∂pim
∂q = tp +
p 2
q 2
− 2θqt = 0; (a3
∂pim
∂p = θ −
2p
q
+ qt = 0; (a4
p m = 2θ2/(9t) qm = θ/(3t). xm = θ/(3t)
pim = θ3/(27t).
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The behaviour of the single-product monopolist under full market coverage is described
in Section 2. I am now in a position to compare the performance of the monopolist in the two
alternative settings. The following obtains:
for all In particular, condition (a5) holds as a strict inequality for all values of except
for which it holds as an equality. Analogous calculations are needed to obtain the same
results when more than one product is supplied.
Consider now the oligopoly problem. Here I shall confine myself to a duopoly, showing
that if both prices and qualities are optimally set by duopolists, there exists an interval for the
relevant parameter where firms strictly prefer to serve all consumers, while the opposite holds
outside such interval. Consider a duopoly made up by single product firms. Under the full market
coverage assumption, provided it can be shown that duopolists symmetrically locate
their respective varieties outside the range defined by consumers’ preferred qualities and obtain
(see Cremer and Thisse, 1994). Under the partial market coverage assumption,
the poorest consumers are not being served, so that demands are defined as follows:
Profits are defined as in (13). The standard solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium
in two stages. Proceeding as usual by backward induction, one can solve for the simultaneous
equilibrium in prices and then in qualities, whose generic expression is
θ3
27t
≥
(θ − 1)2
4t
(a5
θ ≥ 1. θ
θ = 3,
θ > 5/4,
piH = piL = 3/(16t)
xH = θ −
(pH − pL)
qH − qL
; xL =
(pH − pL)
qH − qL
−
pL
qL
. (a6
15
Finally, equilibrium profits are and or, in general,
It is now possible to verify that the high (low) quality firm prefers partial to
full market coverage if (2.4897). Analogous conclusions can be reached when more
than two varieties are produced.
qi(θ) = θqi(θ = 1), i = H , L . (a7
piH = 0.0164
θ3
t
piL = 0.0122
θ3
t
,
pii(θ) = θ3pii(θ = 1).
θ > 2.2525
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